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Home as a Site of State-Corporate
Violence: Grenfell Tower, Aetiologies
and Aftermaths
STEVE TOMBS
Professor of Criminology, The Open University
Abstract: Focusing on the aftermaths and consequences of the Grenfell Tower fire,
this article reveals the factors which combined to produce a fire that could have such
devastating effects. Further, it delineates the discrete ways in which distinct types of
harms – physical, emotional and psychological, cultural and relational, and financial
and economic – continue to be produced by a combination of State and corporate acts and
omissions. Some of these harms are readily apparent, others are opaque and obscured. It
concludes by showing how failures to mitigate these factors constitute one manifestation
of the more general phenomenon of ‘social murder’.
Keywords: corporate crime; home; social murder; State-corporate violence;
Grenfell
While research, writing and activism around the phenomena of corporate
and State crime have burgeoned since they first reached mainstream aca-
demic attention in the 1960s, such crimes remain relatively obscured by
the crimes of the usual suspects. This is despite the fact that corporate
and State crimes and harms kill, injure, defraud, and poison many, many
more people than so-called conventional crimes; moreover, they often do
so relatively silently, with their role and mutual complicity rarely becoming
apparent and, if attaining visibility, are rarely brought within the purview
of crime, let alone violent crime (Tombs and Whyte 2015). Finally, if curi-
ously, they are rarely exposed in relation to ‘the home’.
Here I cast a critical lens on a recent atrocity – the fire at Grenfell Tower
in West London – and examine how we might focus on this as an instance
of State-corporate violence. In indicating the ways in which a combination
of State and corporate acts and omissions resulted in a fire producing a
range of social harms, I bring to the fore how ‘home’ can be the site of
State-corporate criminality and harm.
The article begins by setting out some of the key parameters of corporate
crime, then State-corporate crime, before indicating why, and how, many
of these are best understood as crimes of violence. The main sections of
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the article then focus on some of the key dynamics which contextualised,
produced, and then followed the fire at Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017,
which killed 72 residents and detrimentally affected, forever, the lives of
many, many more.
A Conceptual Introduction: From Corporate Crime to State Corporate
Violence
Corporate crime is a broad term, covering a large range of offences of
omission and commission with differing types of modus operandi, per-
petrators, effects, and victims. Because ‘corporate crime’ refers to a wide
range of events and processes, it is often classified into ‘types’, one com-
mon classification covering financial offences, crimes against employees,
the natural environment, and consumers.
Academic studies have focused upon a range of financial crimes, includ-
ing: illegal share dealings, mergers and takeovers; tax evasion; bribery;
and illegal accounting practices. Crimes such as those by Enron, Guinness
and BCCI are symbolic of the term ‘financial crime’, and may target other
companies, shareholders, governments, or consumers. But most financial
crimes are far less visible than these iconic exemplars even as they victimise
millions of consumers (Slapper and Tombs 1999) – a classic example here,
and one directly focused on the home, were the endowment mortgage
frauds of the 1990s – mis-selling a particularly risky mortgage product to
high-risk customers generated up to five million victims (Fooks 2003).
A second class of corporate crimes are offences arising from the em-
ployment relationship. These include sexual and racial discrimination,
violations of wage laws, of rights to organise and take industrial action,
and various occupational health and safety offences. Now, while these of-
fences generally originate in work and the workplace, there are various
ways in which they impinge upon ‘home’. Although relatively obscured in
discussions of work, latest figures for the UK show some 4.3 million people
work at home or use home as their main base for work (Office for National
Statistics 2018) – while we know that such working is generally poorly pro-
tected, not least in terms of occupational health and safety (Tombs and
Whyte 2007).
Third are a series of crimes against the environment, including illegal
emissions to air, water, and land, hazardous waste dumping, and illegal
manufacturing practices. A focus on this area was very much at the fore-
front of the emergence of the sub-genre around eco-crimes, commonly
referred to as ‘Green’ criminology (Lynch 1990).
A final category of corporate crimes are those committed directly against
consumers: illegal sales/marketing practices; the sale of unfit goods; con-
spiracies to fix prices and/or carve up market share; and various forms of
false/illegal labelling. Below, I consider some crimes and harms associated
with the manufacture and sale of ‘white goods’ in the UK.
So there is a range of known corporate crimes and harms, some of
which impact directly, others indirectly, upon the home. But there is a
further set of observations to be made here regarding these crimes and
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harms – namely, to highlight the role of states in their production. That
is, whether at national or local level, states legitimate (through the absence
of regulation) or turn a blind eye to (via non-enforcement of regulation)
harmful and potentially criminal corporate practices. Indeed, even more
than this, states collude in the production of crime and harm through
increasingly symbiotic relationships with private companies and in newly-
created markets following privatisation, deregulation or, typically, both
(Bittle et al. 2018).
Such considerations point to the significance of the concept of ‘State-
corporate crime’. Developed by corporate crime scholars in the US, the
term ‘State-corporate crime’ first appeared in 1990, whenMichalowski and
Kramer (2006) defined this phenomenon as signifying ‘illegal or socially
injurious actions that occur when one or more institutions of political gov-
ernance pursue a goal in direct co-operation with one or more institutions
of economic production and distribution’ (p.15). The concept directs our
attention, first, towards the way in which deviant organisational outcomes
are not discrete acts, but rather the outcome of relationships between dif-
ferent social institutions. Second, by focusing upon the relational character
of the State, the concept of State-corporate crime foregrounds the ways in
which horizontal relationships between economic and political institutions
contain powerful potential for the production of socially injurious actions
(Kramer and Michalowski 2006, p.21).
For Michalowski, Kramer and other scholars of State-corporate crime,
such crime can be initiated and facilitated by states. Thus, corporations
either engage in illegality at the prompt of, or with the approval of, State
institutions, and/or State actors fail to prevent, respond to, or collude with
such illegality. More recently, Lasslett (no date) has usefully expanded
upon these subcategories:
Corporate-initiated state crime occurs when corporations directly employ their eco-
nomic power to coerce states into taking deviant actions. Corporate-facilitated state
crime, on the other hand, occurs when corporations either provide the means
for the state’s criminality (e.g. weapons sales), or when they fail to alert the domes-
tic/international community to the state’s criminality, because these deviant practices
directly/indirectly benefit the corporation concerned.
If we need increasingly to think of State-corporate crime as opposed to
merely corporate crime, and if the conditions of existence of states and
corporations have become increasingly symbiotic (Bittle et al. 2018), then
the final point to be emphasised about these relationships is that they pro-
duce violent outcomes. Corporate and State activity, in their combination,
their relationships, their mutual dependencies have produced, and con-
tinue to produce, a range of physical harms, the effects of which look very
much like the effects of that which we most commonly understand as ‘vio-
lence’ – acute or premature death, injury, illness and long-term suffering
through physical impairment (Tombs 2010). What is also clear is that the
vast majority of these harms are not treated as violence by the criminal jus-
tice system (nor through the media, nor by academics, nor in popular and
political discussions of the violence ‘problem’, and so on). This then begs
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at least two questions: can such physical harms legitimately be categorised
as violence; and, if so, why are they not treated as such?
In a previous review of some key ‘critical’ approaches to violence it was
concluded that a wide range of such approaches, not least in and around
criminology, shared two fundamental characteristics (Tombs 2007): first,
a primacy granted to intention; and, second, a focus upon individual,
as opposed to collective, sources of violence, and thus the centrality of
violence as interpersonal as opposed to structural. Indeed, both of these
assumptions reflect the definitions of violence which tend to be enshrined
within systems of criminal law and criminal justice.
Yet if we are able to abandon an epistemological commitment to individ-
ualism, thenmore encompassing definitions and considerations of violence
become possible. For example, Hills (1987), in introducing a collection of
case histories of ‘corporate violence’, defines this phenomenon as:
Actual harm and risk of harm inflicted on consumers, workers, and the general
public as a result of decisions by corporate executives or managers, from corporate
negligence, the quest for profits at any cost, and wilful violations of health, safety
and environmental laws. (p.vii)
Moving away from the individual and the intentional allows us to develop
a much more inclusive and, I would argue, adequate understanding of
violence which captures institutional and structural violence as well as
that produced by policies, processes, states of affairs, omissions and non-
decisions, and negligence (Cooper andWhyte 2017; Tombs 2007) Through
this broader lens of what constitutes violence, we now turn to examine the
atrocity at Grenfell.
Grenfell as a Site of State-Corporate Violence
These considerations lead us to an exploration of Grenfell as a site of
State-corporate violence. As a preface, we need to state what is perhaps
blindingly obvious: that Grenfell Tower was home to hundreds of people –
in excess of 200 households. Indeed, the Tower itself sat in the midst
of the Lancaster West Estate, a large estate of more than 1,000 diverse
households, built in the late 1960s in North Kensington, West London.
Thus ‘home’ works in several ways in this context: as a physical unit within
which people lived, slept, ate, and so on, and as a place of shelter and
warmth – albeit in varying ways. ‘Home’ also connotes a sense of a place
to which people had various kinds of emotional commitments and cultural
experiences. And, finally, home indicates a broader geographical area, a
wider physical space, indeed a space to which people also felt differing
levels of attachments. Taking these together, it is worth noting that the
strong sense of community in the area within whichGrenfell stood has been
frequently remarked upon in the aftermath of the atrocity. For example:
There is a palpable sense of community in North Kensington. There is a
strong community and voluntary sector with a large and varied number of
organisations . . . The diversity and many communities within North Kensington
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make it a place with a strong sense of identity, social capital and depth of social
networks. (Strelitz et al. 2018, p.37)
Grenfell, then, was a home in many senses of the word. As we shall see
in the following three parts of this extended section, it was also a place of
three aspects or forms of State-corporate violence.
Prior to this substantive discussion per se, a brief note on method. None
of what follows is based upon primary research. That said, Grenfell is
a multi-fatality disaster in the age of both 24/7 news and social media;
there is a mass of material about Grenfell, and some of this consists of
relatively unmediated, direct access to the voices of local people themselves,
whether this be via the broadcast media (accessible long after recording),
the print media, or through blogs and various social media accounts. To the
extent to which here I support my claims with the voices of the residents,
then these latter are the sources I have used to do so. This means that
some are purely personal observations. That said, in the context of the
arguments in the following section, such voices were often articulating
variations on what became very clear themes, as regards, for example, the
horrors of 14 June, or the experiences of temporary accommodation. For
these reasons, therefore, and for reasons of space, I use these voices here
relatively sparingly.
Grenfell as State-Corporate Violence I: Refurbishment as Domicide
The concept of ‘domicide’ has recently been used by Paton and Cooper
(2017) to ‘describe the violent impact that austerity cuts and welfare
reforms have on tenants’:
Domicide describes ‘the deliberate destruction of home by human agency in the
pursuit of specific goals, which causes suffering to the victims’. In other words, ‘the
murder of home’ . . . At the everyday level, domicide involves the destruction of
homes and neighbourhoods through ‘normal, mundane operations of the world’s
political economy’ which manifests through national and local level policy changes
that affect housing. Thus, the destruction of people’s homes is not inevitable but
the direct result of human intervention, where policy is as mighty as the bulldozer.
We extend the understanding of everyday domicide to describe how austerity cuts
have increased housing insecurity and rent arrears, with tenants in social andprivate
renting now facing the greatest risk of eviction and being purged from their home
communities. (p.166)
Now, it is certainly not the claim here that Grenfell Tower was destroyed as
a matter of policy, nor austerity, nor intent. But if we examine briefly the
context and nature of the refurbishment of the Tower between 2014 and
2016, we can understand this both as the contextual cause of the fire and
as a form of violence upon tenants and their homes.
Grenfell Tower is located in Notting Dale Ward of the Royal Borough of
Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC), one of the poorest wards in the Borough
(Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea Council 2014), and is located
in the English Index of Multiple Deprivation Lower Super Output Area1
(LSOA) denominator E01002880. In 2015, this was ranked the 3,171th
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most deprived LSOA of the 32,844 LSOAs in England – that is, in the 10%
‘of the most multiply deprived LSOAs in England’ (Murray 2017).
On the basis of the government’s own data, then, this is an area of
absolute deprivation – but it also sits cheek-by-jowl with one of the richest
areas in the country, making the extent of relative deprivation staggering.
The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea ‘is among London’s most
unequal, with extreme poverty and wealth living side by side. Data shows
that the vicinity of the Tower was among the top 10% most deprived areas
in England in 2015 . . . The constituency of Kensington, which makes up
most of the local authority of Kensington and Chelsea, is the wealthiest in
England’, where ‘The average terraced house sold for £4.3m in 2016’
(Barr 2017). Murray contrasts LSOA E01002880 with what he calls the
‘Kings Road South’ LSOA in the Borough, where ‘the rankings for income,
employment, education and health are all in the most advantaged decile
and in the 96 to 97 per cent range of the least deprived. For income,
employment and education the ranking are in the top one per cent of the
most advantaged’ (Murray 2017).
Thus, while the borough has ‘the highest average incomes in London’,
its north end is characterised by ‘above average poverty rates, child poverty,
and receipt of out-of-work benefits’ (London’s Poverty Profile 2017). There
are other correlates of such inequalities of course, one being life expectancy.
As the recent Marmot review noted, life expectancy varies across En-
glish local authorities – an average of 74 years for men in Blackpool and
79 years for women in Manchester as compared with 83 and 86 years
for men and women respectively in Kensington and Chelsea. But this
masks considerable inequalities within Kensington and Chelsea. Thus the
starkest inequalities within English local authorities were to be found ‘in
Blackpool, Stockton on Tees and Kensington and Chelsea’ where the in-
equalities translate into life expectancy differentials between the poorest
and richest ‘in the region of 14 to 15 years’ (Institute of Health Equity
2017, p.3). Indeed, it is not just that the area within which Grenfell Tower
sits is absolutely and relatively poor – but, as Emma Dent Coad’s (2017)
report indicates, it is getting poorer. According to this collation of data
by the local MP, since 2010 the poor in the constituency have got poorer,
the rich richer, and inequality in the most unequal area in England has
widened – for example, in one ward, average life expectancy had declined
by six years from 2010 to 2017 (Coad 2017, p.1).
It is in this context that we can better understand both the conditions in
which residents of Grenfell Tower and the Lancaster West Estate lived and,
most crucially, their relationships with RBKC Council and the Kensington
and Chelsea Tenants Management Organisation (KCTMO) to which the
Council had transferred the management of the Borough’s entire council
housing stock, 9,700 homes, in 1996 (Boughton 2017).
Stanning (2017) has argued that KCTMOwas universally hated by those
it housed across the Borough, a hatred which ‘goes beyond the usual
suspicion of residents towards those who have power over them. KCTMO
has for years been an unaccountable and deeply resented part of life for
many Kensington and Chelsea residents’. Below, I discuss further what I
125
C© 2020 The Authors. The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice published by Howard
League and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
The Howard Journal Vol 59 No 2. June 2020
ISSN 2059-1098, pp. 120–142
think is best characterised as an attitude of contempt by the KCTMO for
Grenfell residents, but for now it should be noted that the nature of this
contemptuous relationship was perhaps nowhere better captured than in
the refurbishment of the Tower which was ultimately to prove fatal for at
least 72 of its residents – and, in particular, the disastrous decision to clad
the Tower which, according to one local resident, was taken ‘because it
was an eyesore for the rich people who live opposite’ (Akala, musician and
local resident, C4 News, 15 June 2017). Such relationships have been said
to typify wider processes of gentrification and social cleansing in many of
the UK’s inner cities, but most notably in London (MacLeod 2018).
Formed in 2010, the Grenfell Action Group (GAG) joined with Unite
Community Membership in 2015, principally as a result of concerns about
the refurbishment of the Tower (Grenfell Action Group 2015b). In this con-
text, the Group documented ‘threatening and intimidatory tactics’ being
used by the TMO and Rydon, the lead contractor in the Tower’s refurbish-
ment, to get access to flats – access which had been denied in response to
what GAG saw as substandard and dangerous work. The Group set out a
long list of residents’ ‘primary concerns with regards TMO/Rydon’, at the
top of which was the ‘(l)ack of meaningful consultation with residents and
feeling of total disregard for tenant and leaseholders’ well-being’ (Grenfell
Action Group 2015a). Concerns relating to the lack of fire safety instruc-
tions, power surges, the single staircase egress in the event of a fire, and
the exposure of gas pipes within the flats as a result of the refurbishment
were commonly expressed. As GAG posted at 5 am on the morning of the
fire as the Tower was still in flames:
Regular readers of this blog will know that we have posted numerous warnings in
recent years about the very poor fire safety standards at Grenfell Tower and else-
where in RBKC. ALL OUR WARNINGS FELL ON DEAF EARS and we predicted
that a catastrophe like this was inevitable and just a matter of time. (Grenfell Action
Group 2017)
The starkest of these warnings had been published in November 2016,
under the apocryphal but prescient headline KCTMO – Playing with Fire!,
which included the following, chilling passage:
It is a truly terrifying thought but the Grenfell Action Group firmly believe that
only a catastrophic event will expose the ineptitude and incompetence of our land-
lord, the KCTMO, and bring an end to the dangerous living conditions and ne-
glect of health and safety legislation that they inflict upon their tenants and lease-
holders. . . . [O]nly an incident that results in serious loss of life of KCTMO resi-
dents will allow the external scrutiny to occur that will shine a light on the practices
that characterise the malign governance of this non-functioning organisation . . .
The Grenfell Action Group predict that it won’t be long before the words of this
blog come back to haunt the KCTMO management and we will do everything in
our power to ensure that those in authority know how long and how appallingly
our landlord has ignored their responsibility to ensure the health and safety of
their tenants and leaseholders. They can’t say that they haven’t been warned!
(Grenfell Action Group 2016, bold emphasis in original)
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It needs to be emphasised that it was these relations of contempt between
the KCTMO and RBKCC on the one hand and the residents on the other
which were so pivotal in producing the conditions in which the fire be-
came almost an inevitability – foreseen precisely and most tragically of
all by the residents themselves (Grenfell Action Group 2016). Further,
these relations can only be understood in the context of the enormous
and growing inequalities within the Borough – highlighted above – and
the perverse nature of restructured housing markets produced by years
of privatisation, deregulation, and rampant neoliberalism. These contexts
together explain the politico-economic production of the harms manifest
at Grenfell: ‘part of a larger story about unevenly precarious lives in today’s
unequal cities . . . a chilling illustration of how inequality kills’ (Madden
2017).
It must, then, be utterly devastating for anyone remotely connected to
Grenfell Tower to realise that this atrocity was the result of a conscious
decision by the council to save £293,000. This does not mean that there
was any intention to cause the fire nor the deaths that resulted. But this
level of cost-cutting by the richest council in England could be viewed as
indicative of the contempt which Grenfell residents stated that they had
‘endured . . . for years’ (C4 News, 19 July 2017). What has been described
by their MP as ‘a real disdain for people lower down the social order’ (Dent
Coad (2017), cited on C4 News, 25 July 2017) must generate an enduring
sense of worthlessness that the residents in and around the area will find
hard to shake off. As one teenaged resident stated outside the Tower as it
continued to burn: ‘We’re dying in there because we don’t count’ (Wynne
Jones 2017). As another local resident put it: ‘The people who died and
lost their homes, this happened to them because they are poor’ (C4 News,
15 June 2017). Such views were widely articulated by the local community
across media coverage in the immediate aftermath of the atrocity.
Very quickly after the fire, ‘cost-cutting’ emerged ‘as a key theme in the
Grenfell refurbishment’ (Booth and Evans 2017). It was revealed that, in
2014, a decision was taken to replace fire-resistant zinc cladding in the
refurbishment contract ‘with cheaper aluminium panels to save £293,368’,
with further evidence of the drive to cut costs in an ‘urgent nudge email’
which KCTMO’s project manager sent to Artelia, its cost consultant, about
cladding prices. It said: ‘We need good costs for Cllr Feilding-Mellen2 and
the planner tomorrow at 8.45am!’ (cited in Booth andGrierson 2017). This
option was chosen. It was an option chosen by a Council with £274 million
in reserves at the time of the fire, and one which had, in 2014, ‘decided
to hand back £100 to residents paying the top rate of council tax after a
claimed overachieving efficiency drive’ (Syal and Jones 2017). This is also
the same Council which, in 2016, had raised £4.5 million from the sale of
just two of its homes, more than the cost of all of the cladding used in the
Grenfell Tower refurbishment (Booth and Evans 2017). As one resident
said to the new Council leader at a public meeting: ‘the culture that you
promote is the same culture that brought Grenfell into being. Because you
don’t listen, you don’t care’ (C4 News, 4 November 2017). Indeed.
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Grenfell as State-Corporate Violence II: The Ongoing Production of State-Corporate
Harm
Grenfell was, and is, many things: an atrocity, the biggest fire in Britain for
generations, perhaps a crime of corporate manslaughter (the latter under
consideration by the Metropolitan Police as I write) – and, for some, a
testimony to the violence of austerity (Cooper and Whyte 2018).
Whatever else Grenfell was, or may prove to be, we can surely agree
that the fire both was, and remains, a source of considerable social harm.
Harms produced by the fire are perhaps most obviously physical, as well as
emotional and psychological – even if not all of the harmful effects of the
fire within these categories are as immediately apparent as others, as we
shall see. Moreover, there is also a range of financial, economic, cultural,
and relational harms associated the fire, which I discuss, below.
I will not rehearse the arguments ‘for’ a social harm perspective here
(see Hillyard and Tombs 2017), suffice to say that for all the problems
associated with the latter perspective there are good reasons why it is a
useful lens through which to view the tragedy at Grenfell Tower. A social
harm perspective overcomes (or some might say augments) the focus on
crime and criminal law, which, in the context of fatal injury, tends to be on
acts, usually between proximate individuals, alongside the establishment
of intention behind these acts. This lens of crime all too often restricts us to
a ‘snapshot’ of social life. By contrast, a social harm perspective allows us
to incorporate omissions, decision and non-decisions taken, policies devel-
oped, defended, and implemented, and practices and cultures established,
over long periods of time – so that we can think of these in combina-
tion in terms of conditions, states of affairs, incubating phenomena and
chains of processes. Thus, the harms of Grenfell have been, and will con-
tinue to be, produced by a combination of State and corporate acts and
omissions which both produced, and then have in combination failed ade-
quately to respond to, the fire. This complexity characterises the necessary
antecedents to high-consequence phenomena such as Grenfell, but many
others known to readers of this journal, such as Bhopal, Hillsborough,
Piper Alpha, and so on.
These are relatively familiar arguments ‘for’ a social harm approach.
But while such an approach would prevent us from looking at Grenfell –
and other harmful phenomena – merely as an event, it at the same time is an
event, albeit one which sets in train a whole series of further, rippled, lay-
ered harmful consequences. A social harm lens is able to capture the range
of harmful consequences that follow from any specific event; to capture the
various dimensions of social harms; to explore how these unfold; to note that
these unfold in ripples, initially and perhaps most intensely within a specific
time and place – here, a burning tower – but then disperse geographically
and longitudinally. Nor, indeed, despite being discussed through discrete
categories, do such harms exist nor unfold in a discrete sense – they are lay-
ered, they interact, often complexly – thus producing new or heightened
levels of harm through their synergistic effects.
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To turn to these harms per se. Clearly, the fire produced a series of
physical harms. The most manifest harms associated with the fire are, of
course, the 72 immediate deaths which it is recorded as causing. Moreover,
a week after the fire, the clinical director of the major trauma centre at
King’s College Hospital, said that: ‘Many of the people who have survived
will go on to make a good recovery, but how many will have life-changing
injuries remains to be seen. Itmay take weeks andmonths for some patients
to recover physically’ (cited in The Scotsman 2017).
There are other possible physical health effects of the fire which are
perhaps less identifiable. It is not fully known what airborne toxins might
have been emitted as a result of the fire, and what long-term effects ex-
posures to these might be felt by residents and those living in the vicinity.
However, we do know that asbestos was present in the building – denied
by Public Health England for almost a year after the fire, and thus denying
any health screening to possibly affected local residents – while hydrogen
cyanide was emitted from the burning insulation and will be a cause of
long-term detrimental health effects for an unknowable number of sur-
vivors (see, more generally, Stec et al. 2019).
In addition to causing death, injury and illness, various aspects of the
aftermath of the fire are likely to have caused detrimental health effects.
First, it is likely that anyone with existing problems of alcohol and/or drug
dependency at the time of the fire would have experienced heightened
dependency as a result of the trauma of the fire. Second, many illnesses
associated with deprivation – the residents of Grenfell were among the 10%
most deprived in England – such as diabetes, obesity, high blood pressure
and cholesterol, are likely exacerbated by their having to live in hotel or
B&B accommodation where control over diet is more difficult to exercise.
Coupled with a range of physical harms was a gamut of psychological
and emotional harms produced by the fire and its aftermath, generating
problems with which many survivors will live for years to come. These
harms are searing and likely experienced in combination: they are associ-
ated with loss – grief was consistently expressed at the loss of loved ones, of
pets and of possessions which cannot be replaced; they are related to the
recall of the horrors of trying to exit the building – and of seeing others
unable to do so, perhaps, then, also generating guilt at survival. More-
over, these latter horrors were not restricted to the residents but were also
experienced by residents around the Tower, by bystanders, members of
the emergency services, and others who provided on-the-ground support.
These have all variously been reported in the aftermath of the fire. None
are surprising. None are easily imaginable by those unaffected. None are,
one suspects, easily remediable, not least given the parlous state of socially-
provided mental health services in the UK. In this context, within a month
or so of the fire, reports began to circulate about suicide attempts and other
manifestations of mental health problems, including post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD), stress, depression and anxiety, as well as increased levels
of drug and alcohol use (see Strelitz et al. 2018).
Further, there is no way of knowing what financial costs were, and
continue to be, incurred by former residents of the Tower, as well as those
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living in the vicinity, but these would include extra travel costs to work
or school, the costs of eating out, of time off to attend meetings, funerals,
medical appointments, and so on. In addition to these financial harms
borne by households are the much more significant (in quantitative terms)
economic costs impacting upon local, regional, and national levels which
will be incurred formany years to come.Many local businesses closed down
in the vicinity, as a housing estate had been transformed into a disaster
zone (Local Enterprise Partnership for London 2018). At the local level,
the Council faces heavy financial costs following the fire. Costs to central
government will be significant. The costs of the inquiry itself will run into
millions. None of this is to mention the fallout costs for other councils
across the country. Numerous councils have tested cladding on high-rise
tower blocks and other public buildings, notably hospitals, and student
accommodation, and many are seeking central government funding for
major cladding-replacement programmes.
Thus, these economic effects of Grenfell Tower are not confined to res-
idents, the local community or even the Borough – there are ripple effects
that are flowing and will continue to flow through communities across the
UK. This, in turn, means that those who are most dependent upon cen-
tral or local services and facilities – those with the least financial indepen-
dence – will be hardest hit. The poor, the disabled and the sick, those on
various forms of benefits, children in the mainstream school system, and,
with no little irony, those in social housing or who lack access to adequate
or any accommodation at all – all will be impacted upon. The least hardest
hit will be the most financially independent – the wealthiest.
Further, discrete categories of harms are those which we might deem
to be cultural and relational. In terms of cultural harms, it is clear that in
their physical relocation from the Tower and area – their dispersal – that
many of both the routines and the networks which constitute social life,
at school, work, the local shops, around the flats, and so on, were ripped
away. People lost their social networks and social supports when they
needed them most; dispersal does not just mean loss of community, it can
mean isolation, desperation or, at best, a state of painful limbo (Topping
2017).
More than this, and directly linked to the forms of State-corporate vi-
olence which helped to produce the fire, there are relational harms that
follow from mistrust of central and local government, each of which were
absent in the immediate aftermath of the fire, and for which Prime Min-
ister May apologised; families expressed their sense of being ‘abandoned’
by the State (INQUEST 2019b, p.14). These relational harms – harms of
misrecognition, defined by Nancy Fraser (2000) as ‘institutionalized subor-
dination’ (p.114) – have proliferated in the aftermath of the fire. They
are evidenced in central government’s uncertain and shifting ‘amnesty’
offered to so-called ‘illegal immigrants’ (a harmful term in itself) – whether
residents of the Tower, or relatives of such. Another was the palpable fail-
ure to meet the commitment made by the PrimeMinister in the immediate
aftermath of the fire – namely that ‘every person made homeless would
receive an offer of accommodation within three weeks’. In fact, this was
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subsequently ‘clarified’ as meaning temporary accommodation (BBCNews
2017). Exactly one year after the fire, only 82 of the 203 households that
needed rehousing were in new, permanent accommodation (Booth and
Bowcott 2018).
These failed commitments further implicated the local authority,
RKMBC, and the TMO. Also, contrary to assurances from government,
local residents were not consulted before the appointment of Judge
Sir Martin Moore-Bick to lead the public inquiry in the light of which
Justice4Grenfell concluded that this ‘further compounds the survivors and
residents sense of distrust in the official response to this disaster’ (Jus-
tice4Grenfell 2017). This underscores the sense of contempt experienced
by the residents after the fire – one which entirely reproduced the attitudes
displayed towards local residents prior to it. And the very lack of consul-
tation does not augur well for the ability of the inquiry to produce lessons
which might generally be learnt to prevent future Grenfells – lessons which
had clearly not been taken on board from a series of preceding high-rise
fires in the UK (BBC2 2018). More generally, the failure to learn lessons
from the avoidable deaths of the vulnerable – such as, for example, those
generated by Inquest verdicts following deaths in custody (Coles and Shaw
2012; INQUEST 2019a) – seems to be a defining characteristic of the
relationship between the powerful and the powerless.
Grenfell as State-Corporate Violence III: Consumer Goods, Safety and Regulation
In these ways, then, Grenfell appears to have been caused by varieties of
State-corporate violence. But there is a third sense in which this observation
can be made in terms of the triggering event of, rather than the context
which incubated the conditions for, the fire. It is with this triggering event
that this section is concerned.
Shortly after the fire, attention began to turn to its immediate
cause – with the ‘culprit’ likely being a Hotpoint fridge freezer. Of interest
for the analysis here – how State-corporate violence enters peoples’ homes
– is the much longer backstory to this, one of the regulation of the sale
and use of ‘white goods’ in the UK. And to narrate this we can, in fact, use
the example of Hotpoint. Let us start with what we know, before turning
to consider how we understand these events as a form of State-corporate
violence in the home.
Within days of the fire, the Metropolitan police (the Met) stated that it
suspected its immediate cause to be a Hotpoint fridge freezer. As part of
their press release in response to this, the manufacturers of the Hotpoint
brand, Whirlpool, stated that:
We are working with the authorities to obtain access to the appliance so that we can
assist with the ongoing investigations. Under these circumstances, we are unable to
speculate on further details at this time.We are addressing this as a matter of utmost
urgency and assisting the authorities in any way we can. We will provide additional
updates as our investigations progress. The government said that consumers do
not need to switch off their fridge freezer pending further investigation. (cited in
Snowdon 2017)
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It is of interest that neither that brand name nor the manufacturer have
featured very much at all in the mass of coverage around the fire and its
aftermath.
It is also worth noting that the consumers’ organisation Which? and the
Chartered Institute for Trading Standards (CTSI) had been campaigning
for several years for a ban on plastic-backed electrical goods. Whirlpool
and other manufacturers had opposed this. In this opposition, Whirlpool
had been consistently supported by Peterborough trading standards – on
which more, below.
Following the Met’s statement, the business secretary, Greg Clark, or-
dered an examination of themodel – which concluded inMay 2018 finding
no inherent fault and no need for a national product recall, the Depart-
ment for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) stating that: ‘the
product met legal safety requirements and that the risk associated with the
model is assessed as low’ (cited in Smithers 2018). Whirlpool said that its
own second investigation also found there was no fault with the model, an-
nouncing: ‘We wish to reassure consumers that these models are safe and
that people may continue to use them as normal. We have fully cooperated
with BEIS as it undertook its investigations, and it has now confirmed that
there are no concerns with these models’(Smithers 2018). The reassurance
was challenged by the consumer groupWhich? asking for clarification as to
whether themodel tested had a flammable plastic backing (Smithers 2018).
Then, almost a year after the fire, on the opening day of the Grenfell
Public Enquiry, a fire safety expert introduced a report which stated that
it was not possible to be certain that the fridge freezer was the initial cause
of the fire, even if it was ‘more likely than not that the area of origin
of the fire was in, or around, the tall fridge freezer in the southeast part
of the kitchen’ (cited in Agerholm 2018). The issue remained dormant
until close to the very end of Phase 1 of the Enquiry when, in November
2018, an expert witness concluded that faulty wiring in the fridge freezer
had been the source of the fire. He added that: ‘models made in the US
must have a back casing made from metallic steel, which can help contain
internal fires’, whereas the ‘plastic allowed for back casings on UK and
European models were combustible and could contribute to fires’ (cited in
SkyNews 2018). Whirlpool challenged the findings, stating that the models
were safe to use. Two weeks later, the company floated at the Enquiry the
claim that the owner of the company which produces the fridge believed
to have started the fire may have been sparked by a lit cigarette (Giordano
2018). In response, the lawyer representing the occupant of the fourth
floor flat where the fire started told the Inquiry:
As far as the theory of the fire having started as a result of something being thrown
through the open window is concerned, this is pure speculation, desperate to put
it politely. There is no evidence in support, it would have been impossible for a
cigarette or some other mystery item to have been launched from ground level
four floors down and it is equally impossible to imagine how a cigarette or some
other mystery item discarded from a flat above could have miraculously entered
the kitchen through the open window, let alone set anything in the vicinity alight.
(cited in Giordano 2018)
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In the Phase 1 report on the fire, therefore, Moore-Bick concluded that:
‘Although some questions remain unanswered, the evidence, viewed as a
whole, leaves me in no doubt that the fire originated in the large fridge-
freezer’ (Grenfell Tower Inquiry 2019, p.514). Wherever the truth lies –
and on balance it seems that the fridge freezer was the trigger for the
atrocity – there is a backstory to the fridge freezer and Whirlpool, one of
corporate power, regulatory failure, and the victimisation of consumers,
which makes it of criminological interest.
In August 2016 – ten months before the Grenfell Tower fire – that
latter fire was chillingly foretold in a relatively unreported event. In a
tower block in Shepherds Bush Green, West London, just over a mile
from Grenfell, a fire caused the 18-story tower block to be evacuated. No
one was injured but images of the tower block burning closely resemble
Grenfell (see BBC News 2016a, 2016b). Moreover, the cause of the fire was
found to be a faulty tumble drier, the Hotpoint brand made by Whirlpool.
In fact, having acquired Indesit (and thus its brands, including Hotpoint)
in 2014, Whirlpool began a series of appliance testing which identified
faults in three brands of tumble driers, namely Hotpoint, Indesit, and
Creda, whereby a build-up of fluff could lead to fires (Pepin with Conway
2017). Parliamentary hearings later revealed that the problems with some
Whirlpool driers had first come to light in 2005, and the Chartered Trad-
ing Standards Institute believed they should have been recalled by 2006
(House of Commons Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Commit-
tee 2017). In November 2015, Whirlpool estimated that about 3.8 million
tumble dryers were affected by the fire risk. Owners were told (i) to contact
Whirlpool for a repair, and (ii) not to use unattended. Whirlpool offered
a programme of repairs, a response supported by Peterborough trading
standards, its regulator under the Primary Authority (PA) scheme – on
which more, below. Despite some political and consumer group pressures,
it perfectly legally resisted calls for a product recall. Note, no product recall
was offered or required, simply a commitment at some point to repair a
product which could not do that for which it had been bought. Owners
were told that they could use the driers, but should be in attendance while
they were in use and not to use the timer button. In fact, it was only in
February 2017, following intense pressure from the London Fire Brigade,
that Whirlpool advised its customers to unplug and not to use the dryers.
In September 2017, an inquest found that a fire in a flat which killed
twomen in Conwy county in October 2014 was most likely caused by a fault
in a Whirlpool tumble dryer. The coroner concluded: ‘On the balance of
probabilities, the fire was caused by an electrical fault in the tumble dryer
in the laundry room of the flat’. The one occupant who survived said the
dryer had been switched off at the time of the fire (Leigh Day 2017).
Alongside this emerging evidence of the hazards associated with some
of its tumble driers, Whirlpool was also more broadly associated with safety
problems with its white goods in the UK. In November 2017, the London
Fire Brigade responded to a Freedom of Information request revealing
that white goods had triggered 2,891 fires in houses, flats, and public set-
tings such as care homes and nurseries, from January 2009 to September
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2017. These had led to ten deaths and 348 injuries. Brands under the
Whirlpool umbrella accounted for 895 fires – the highest of any manufac-
turer (Smithers 2017).
Such data help to explain the establishment, in 2017, of a House of
Commons cross-party committee on The Safety of Electrical Goods in the UK,
producing its report in early 2018. Aspects of the hearing were astonishing,
the report itself damning. On the issue of Whirlpool’s dangerous tumble
driers in particular, the Select Committee’s report found that there were
5.3 million driers affected and that only about half had been repaired.
More broadly, the report noted, variously:
 Between 2010 and 2016, there were 1,598 fires in England caused by
fridge/freezers alone. In 2015/16, 676 fires in England were caused by
tumble dryers, leading to a total of 46 injuries and fatalities. There have
been specific problems identified with defective tumble dryers and there
has also been a campaign to ban plastic-backed fridges because of the
fire safety risks associated with them’. (House of Commons Business,
Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee 2018, para. 1)
 Whirlpool failed to provide an appropriate representative to give evi-
dence, gave incomplete answers to questions and were required to pro-
vide subsequent clarifications and reassurance regarding its actions. This
does not strike us as the actions of a company seeking to repair consumer
trust after serious safety failures with its products’. (House of Commons
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee 2018, para. 30)
 Cuts to local government budgets have affected local Trading Standards’
abilities to deliver consumer protection services, so that ‘[b]etween 2009
and 2016 total spending on local Trading Standards fell from £213m to
£123m . . . This has led to a reduction by 56% of full-time equivalent
Trading Standards staff between 2009 and 2016’. (House of Commons
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee 2018, para. 11)
 The independence of local Trading Standards within Primary Authority
partnerships has been questioned because they provide both advice to
local businesses whilst also ensuring enforcement’. (House of Commons
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee 2018, para. 10)
 We were shocked to hear that Whirlpool and Peterborough Trading
Standards continued to advise consumers they could use defective appli-
ances, even after a major fire and in the face of criticism from consumer
safety organisations. The advice to consumers to attend appliances while
in operation was unrealistic and – given that a fire occurred when this
advice was followed – patently inadequate’. (House of Commons Busi-
ness, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee 2018, p.26)
This latter relationship – between Whirlpool and Peterborough trading
standards – is one of the crucial aspects of this whole episode. Elsewhere
I have considered some of the ways in which the relationships between
the State, the private sector and regulation have been transformed in the
UK in the past 15 years – a changing relationship within which private
business, ostensibly the object of regulation, has increasingly become a
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key vehicle of regulation (Tombs 2016). A paradigmatic instance of this is
being achieved through the PA scheme. This scheme was introduced by
the Labour government in 2009, but given considerable impetus by the
coalition government from 2010, notably following the establishment of the
Better Regulation Delivery Office (BRDO) in 2012, for which oversight of
the scheme was its main priority (Tombs 2016).
According to the BRDO, the scheme:
allows businesses to be involved in their own regulation. It enables them to form
a statutory partnership with one local authority, which then provides robust and
reliable advice for other councils to take into account when carrying out inspections
or addressing non-compliance. The general aim is to ensure that local regulation is
consistent at a national level, but sufficiently flexible to address local circumstances.
The business can decide what level of support it requires, and the resourcing of
partnerships is a matter for the parties concerned. A primary authority can recover
its costs. (Better Regulation Delivery Office 2014, p.2)
When this statement was issued, in April 2014, 1,500 businesses had
established PA relationships across 120 local authorities. The PA since
mushroomed: within three years of this statement, there were 17,358
such relationships across 182 authorities. And in that year, government
stated that: ‘The number of businesses in Primary Authority is expected
to increase from 17,000 to an estimated 250,000 by 2020’ (Regulatory
Delivery 2017, p.4).
PA applies across a vast swathe of areas of regulation, but its main areas
are pollution control, occupational health and safety and other local en-
vironmental health enforcement areas, food safety, trading standards, fire
safety, licensing, petrol storage certification, and explosives licensing. It is a
key regulatory initiative. It allows a company – and, since April 2014, fran-
chises and businesses in trade associations – operating across more than
one local authority area to enter an agreement with one specific local au-
thority to regulate all of its sites, nationally. So, a manufacturer and retailer
like Whirlpool which has production sites and retail outlets across most
of the local authorities in England and Wales can, under the PA scheme,
reach an agreement with one local authority to regulate its systems across
all of its stores in every local authority for complying with a relevant body of
law – Peterborough City Council in the context of trading standards, for
example. To regulate its systems, the company makes a payment to the
local authority, agreed through contract. The benefit for the company,
of course, is the absence of oversight in the vast majority of its premises.
These can be visited in other areas, but any enforcement action needs to
be undertaken through the local authority which is the PA. Should a local
authority wish to prosecute a company signed up to a PA agreement, for
example, it can only do so with the permission of the local authority which
is party to that agreement – an enforcement visit finding non-compliance
with a Hotpoint tumble drier in a retail outlet in St Ives, for example,
would need to raise that with Peterborough trading standards. The likely
outcome of this is that Peterborough trading standards commit to resolving
the issue with Whirlpool in the absence of any enforcement action. In the
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unlikely event of Peterborough agreeing to the latter proceeding, then,
under the scheme, any such action must then entail prior notice being
given to the company; the company can then request that the matter be
referred to the BRDO for determination (Williams 2013). In effect, then,
the scheme is a formal series of barriers to enforcement in the event of
business offending. Government advice on this to businesses is explicit:
Primary authorities generally report low levels of enforcement action against the
businesses they partner with. In the event that an enforcement officer decides to
take action against a business that is in a direct partnership with you, or covered
by a co-ordinated partnership with you, he or she is required to notify you via the
Primary Authority Register. As a primary authority you can direct against (block) an
enforcement action being taken against the business when you have issued relevant
Primary Authority Advice and the business was following it. (Office for Product
Safety and Standards 2018)
The PA scheme is, in effect, a regulatory system which encourages non-
enforcement – and, one might say, collusion in wrongdoing, since the
financial benefits of such contracts to cash-strapped local authorities are
real incentives to avoid adversarial relationships with businesses. This is
more than capture or co-option of an autonomous regulatory agency by
specific private interests (Stigler 1971). Rather, it is an instance of a reg-
ulatory accommodation with, and tolerance of, the institutionalisation of
the unequal distribution and externalising of risk (see Tombs and Whyte
2014). Thus it was, in effect, the shield of Peterborough trading standards,
through their contractual PA agreement, which allowed Whirlpool to con-
tinue to refuse to recall products they knew were not fit for purpose and,
indeed, posed a proven safety risk, which had led to fatalities. Regulation,
ostensibly in existence to protect consumers, residents, workers, and so
on, is being transformed into a form of State-corporate collusion by con-
tract which protects the private sector from law enforcement. A form of
State-corporate violence, no less.
Conclusion: Social Inequality, Social Murder and State-Corporate
Violence
Shildrick (2018) has observed that: ‘the people who died in the Grenfell
Tower or have been affected by the disaster were victims of a neoliberal
regime that inevitably produces casualties and losers along with its winners’
(p.794). Quite so. But in this article I have sought to add some detail to this
rather bald statement: Who, or what, were the authors of this violence?
How is it generated and sustained? And what should be the objects of
popular struggle if it is to be mitigated? Moreover, in so doing I have
attempted to highlight some of the ways we might use the lens of State-
corporate violence, not least in the home, to uncover phenomena which
receive relatively little criminological, criminal justice, nor indeed wider
political attention. Certainly, such a lens was not employed in producing
the Phase 1 report of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry (2019), published as this
article was being written – therein, the easier targets proved to be those
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on the scene, the London Fire Brigade, whose commissioner, Dani Cotton,
went on to resign.
Consistent with the lines of argument developed herein, I conclude by
noting one further way in which we need to understand Grenfell, a final
dimension of State-corporate violence in the home. For one of the effects of
Grenfell has been to support the resuscitation of a concept first circulated
by Engels in the mid-19th Century, a concept he named ‘social murder’:
When one individual inflicts bodily injury upon another, such injury that death
results, we call that deedmanslaughter; when the assailant knew in advance that the
injury would be fatal, we call this deedmurder. But when society places hundreds of
proletarians in such a position that they inevitablymeet a too early and an unnatural
death, one which is quite as much a death by violence as that by the sword or the
bullet; when it deprives thousands of the necessaries of life, places them under
conditions in which they cannot live – forces them . . . to remain in such conditions
until that death ensues which is the inevitable consequence – knows that these
thousands of victims must perish, and yet permits these conditions to remain, its
deed is murder just as surely as the deed of the single individual. (Engels 1845/1969,
p.106)
Thus ‘social murder’ referred to the systematic and routine killing of work-
ers and citizens in the horror of the emergence of industrial capitalism. It
was these conditions which generated the inter- and intra-class struggles
for laws to regulate business and to mitigate much of their profit-driven,
harmful effects which took place in Britain during the 1800s. Then began
the long-term construction of regulatory regimes in Britain.
But this ‘social murder’ is not a matter of historical record – the scale of
contemporary harm remains significant (Tombs and Whyte 2015, pp.30–
70). So it is hardly insignificant that these long-standing regulatory regimes
have been systematically dismantled under conditions of neoliberalism
and, more particularly, in the UK, under neoliberalism in the turbo-
charged context of austerity.
I have considered these trends towards the dismantling of a sys-
tem of social protection at length elsewhere (Tombs 2016), through a
mass of quantitative data across a range of enforcement activities on the
part of local (and national) State regulators.What is most remarkable about
this for a set of social scientific data, is that it uniformly points in the same
direction – it highlights consistent and generalised declines in enforcement
activity since the launch of a new regulatory initiative in 2004, and then
in particular under post-2010 conditions of austerity. For the purposes of
this article, and to state baldly, if we look at enforcement trends in four
key areas of social protection in the UK, from 2010 to 2016, we find, at
local authority level: health and safety at work inspections down by 69%;
food ‘safety’ – hygiene and standards – inspections down 15% and 35%
respectively; pollution control inspections down 55%; and, tellingly, fire
safety inspections down 25%.
More generally, at local authority level, since the post-2010 cuts began to
bite, campaigns to enforce regulation against business have become almost
extinct. This is because most councils, unlike RBKC, have reached rock
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bottom in terms of their ability to maintain services (Sparrow 2014). As an
environmental health officer in Merseyside put it to me: ‘it’s going to come
to the point where it’s going to affect the residents, the local population, in
many ways we are at that point now, public health and protection is being
eroded’ (Tombs 2016, p.167).
It is in this context that it is worth recalling why regulation emerged –
namely, to mitigate the worst effects of capitalist production. Yet in the
last 15 years or so, it has become fashionable – even ‘natural’ – to deride
regulation and those who enforce it. There is a gruesome irony in the fact
that on the morning of the Grenfell Tower fire, 14 June 2017, I was speak-
ing on ‘The State, Social Murder and Social Protection’ at a conference in
Liverpool (‘Emotions and State Power’). My topic was how regulation had
become an object of hatred, facilitating the dismantling of social protection.
At the same time, the scale of harm, not least death, continues – virtually
under any political, popular or academic radar. As I have indicated here,
this is a story about social inequality and social murder. And it is one well
captured through the lens of State-corporate violence, a violence which
extends into people’s homes – and, as Grenfell indicates, can destroy those
homes.
Notes
1 The smallest unit of analysis, drilling down to an area of some 500–600 households
or 1,500 people.
2 Deputy leader of Kensington and Chelsea Borough Council and Head of Housing.
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